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Discussion of Do Acquirers Manage
Earnings Prior to a Share for Share Bid
Steven Young∗
Botsari and Meeks (2008) (hereafter BM) replicate the analysis of Erickson and Wang
(1999) using a sample of UK acquirers. Empirical tests seek to determine whether
bidders in share swap acquisitions manipulate earnings upwards during the pre-
acquisition period in an attempt to inflate their share price and hence minimise the
number of shares issued in exchange for the target. BM present results consistent with
this prediction and as such their findings add to a growing body of evidence highlighting
the importance of capital market-driven incentives for earnings management. My
discussion focuses on the following aspects of their study. First, I examine the theory
underlying BM’s main prediction and review their empirical findings. Then I discuss
aspects of BM’s research design from the perspective of both their study and the broader
earnings management literature.
1. THEORY AND EVIDENCE
(i) The Benefits and Costs of Inflating Share Price in a Share Swap Acquisition
The paper’s central thesis is that bidders in share for share acquisitions inflate their
share price immediately prior to the acquisition agreement date to reduce the cost of
acquiring the target (because the number of shares exchanged with target shareholders
is typically based on the value of the bidder’s shares on the acquisition agreement date).
Accordingly, a higher share price reduces the number of shares issued by the bidder
in the exchange. BM do not explain in any detail precisely how shareholders of the
bidding firm benefit from such behaviour; and neither do they consider the potential
costs associated with this strategy.
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that acquirers can use overvalued stock to purchase
real assets at less than their economic value to the benefit of their original shareholders,
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even if share price subsequently falls. Assuming that the acquirer’s share price reverts
to its true value following the acquisition, the per share gain to shareholders of the
acquiring firm (GA) is given by:
G A =
(
V PMA + VT
SA + NSTA
)
− P PMA , (1)
where V PMA is pre-manipulated aggregate value of the acquirer, VT is the agreed
acquisition value of the target, SA is the number of shares outstanding in the acquirer
prior to the deal, NSTA is the number of new shares issued by the acquirer to purchase
the target, and P PMA is the true (i.e., pre-manipulated) share price of the acquirer.
The aggregate gain to the acquirer’s shareholders is equal to GA × SA.1 Holding
overvaluation of the acquirer’s shares constant, the gain to bidder shareholders is
increasing in the acquisition price, suggesting that the incentive to manipulate earnings
upward to boost share price will be more pronounced for larger deals. Unfortunately,
the scope for sample partitioning based on deal value is limited by sample size in BM’s
case.
Erickson and Wang (1999) suggest that shareholders of acquiring firms may also
benefit from a lower exchange ratio through a reduction in earnings dilution. Prior
research suggests that managers view earnings dilution as a potentially serious problem
(despite the absence of any overall valuation implications in a traditional corporate
finance framework).2 However, the importance of earnings dilution in the context
of share swap acquisitions is ambiguous because although the pure share issue effect
serves to dilute bidders’ post-acquisition eps, this will be offset in cases where the target’s
underlying eps performance exceeds that of the acquirer. (Indeed it is possible that
eps for combined entity could increase as a consequence of the acquisition.) All else
equal, therefore, the impact of earnings dilution considerations on the incentive to
inflate share price is likely to be most pronounced for deals where the number of
shares issued by the acquirer to fund the acquisition represents a high proportion of
existing shares outstanding and where the bidder’s eps substantially exceeds that of the
target firm.
Other possible reasons why bidders might seek to minimise the exchange ratio by
manipulating share prices upward include avoiding dilution of shareholders’ voting and
control rights (Erickson and Wang, 1999) and minimising equity servicing costs.3 While
BM and Erickson and Wang (1999) both document evidence consistent with earnings
1 The precise source of these gains depends on the behaviour of the target’s shareholders. If target
shareholders retain their shares beyond the price reversal date, then they bear the entire cost of this wealth
transfer. However, target shareholders can insulate themselves from this wealth loss by selling out for cash
before the price reversal occurs. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that target shareholders who sell out soon
after the acquisition effective date gain from acquisitions, whereas those who hold on to the acquirer’s stock
received as payment find their gains diminish over time.
2 In their survey of corporate finance practices, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that eps dilution remains
one of the biggest concerns for managers in equity issuance. Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005)
report that two-thirds of their survey respondents feel that offsetting dilution is important or very important
in affecting share repurchase decisions.
3 Discussions with investment bankers suggest that the cost of servicing equity represents an important
practical issue for bidders in share swap acquisitions. All else equal, bidders pursuing a high dividend
payout strategy are predicted to minimise the number of shares issued because this helps avoid the risk of
unsustainably high payout ratios. This effect is expected to be particularly acute when the bidder’s dividend
yield is substantially higher than the target’s yield.
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management by bidders in swap acquisitions, the precise reason or reasons driving
this behaviour remain unclear. Research designed to elucidate managers’ incentives to
artificially increase share price prior to a share for share acquisition would therefore
represent a useful contribution to the literature.
BM focus exclusively on the benefits of overvalued equity; the costs associated
with overvaluation are either overlooked or implicitly assumed to be immaterial.
However, recent research documents potentially serious costs to overvalued equity in
the form of low accounting quality (Kothari, Loutskina and Nikolaev, 2006), excessive
debt and equity issues (Baker and Wurgler, 2002), overinvestment in fixed assets
(Polk and Sapienza, 2004), value-destroying acquisitions (Jensen, 2005; and Moeller,
Schlingemann and Stulz, 2005), and a higher probability of legal action (DuCharme,
Malatesta and Sefcik, 2004). Assuming the earnings management documented by BM
is an attempt by acquirers’ managers to temporarily boost share prices in an effort
to minimise the exchange ratio, the extent to which such behaviour benefits bidders’
shareholders in the long-run remains an open question worthy of future research.
(ii) Overvalued Equity as an Alternative Explanation
An alternative interpretation consistent with BM’s evidence of earnings management
prior to share swap acquisitions is rooted in the literature on overvalued equity.
Jensen (2005, p. 5) defines a firm as being overvalued when it is unable to deliver
(except by luck) the performance implicit in its market price. A growing body of
research articulates the agency costs of overvalued equity, which include manipulating
earnings and undertaking value-destroying acquisitions paid for using equity (Jensen,
2005; Kothari, Loutskina and Nikolaev, 2006; and Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz,
2005). This evidence suggests a scenario in which managers artificially inflate reported
earnings to promote or sustain temporary overvaluation, which in turn increases the
likelihood of subsequent acquisitions paid for using (overvalued) shares. Empirically,
this scenario yields an identical prediction to that tested by BM: earnings management
by share swap bidders in the pre-acquisition period. However, the earnings management
in this scenario is not a direct consequence of acquirers’ desire to minimise the
exchange ratio in equity financed acquisitions, as predicted by BM. Instead, the earnings
management and share financed acquisitions are both driven by overvaluation. BM’s
tests do not provide a means of discriminating between these competing (though not
necessarily mutually exclusive) hypotheses.4 Given that the sample window in BM’s
analysis includes a period characterised by severe overvaluation in certain sectors,
further research aimed at disentangling these competing effects seems warranted.
4 Results of supplementary tests reported in Section 5 using performance-matched discretionary accruals
(Kothari, Sabino and Zach, 2005) may shed some light on this issue. Findings presented in Table 15 provide
little evidence of statistically significant levels of income increasing earnings management in year 0 after
controlling for underlying ROA performance. These findings contrast with those reported in Table 8 using
the traditional Jones model. Instead, results in Table 15 provide robust evidence of earnings management in
year −1. Evidence of manipulation in year −1 (i.e., earnings released at least 14 months prior to the agreement
date) coupled with the absence of earnings management in year 0 is, I would argue, more consistent with
the overvalued equity hypothesis than the acquisition-driven earnings management hypothesis.
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2. RESEARCH DESIGN
(i) Financial Statement Data Sources
BM attribute discrepancies in accrual results using the balance sheet and cash
flow methods to measurement error associated with the balance sheet approach.
Measurement error in accruals computed using changes in successive balance sheets
is likely to be a particular problem when examining earnings management around
acquisitions due to a break down in articulation between consolidated changes in
balance sheet accounts and the accrual component of revenues and expenses reported
in the consolidated income statement (Hribar and Collins, 2002). Accordingly, BM
conclude that findings reported using the cash flow method are likely to be more
reliable. While I accept the proposed benefits of using the cash flow method in such
circumstances, practical data considerations may confound these benefits in BM’s
case.
BM measure operating accruals using data from Thomson Financial’s Worldscope
database. Worldscope contains standardised financial statement data: Thomson analysts
adjust reported numbers in accordance with Worldscope’s editorial rules to reverse out
differences in local accounting practices and enhance the international comparability
of their data.5 Testing for evidence of earnings management using Worldscope-adjusted
data (rather than as-reported numbers) is potentially problematic because the resulting
accrual measures risk conflating comparability adjustments made by Worldscope with
accrual choices made by management; and this problem will be exacerbated when
the magnitude of Worldscope adjustments varies across the individual items used to
compute accruals.
Alves, Beekes and Young (2007) compare the properties of income statement,
balance sheet and cash flow statement items from Worldscope with corresponding items
from Extel Financial and the Datastream Company Accounts Archive (both of which
contain as-reported data). Results based on a sample of 11,579 firm-years for 2,830 UK
firms common to all three databases reveal material differences in the definition and
construction of certain variables. In particular, Alves et al. (2007) document dramatic
disparities in operating cash flow: mean and median Worldscope values are 25 percent
lower than those from Extel and the Company Accounts Archive.6 Results reported
by UK retail giant Tesco PLC illustrate the difference between operating cash flow
computed according to UK GAAP and Worldscope’s adjusted operating cash flow
figure. Tesco reported operating cash flows of £1,219, £1,156 and £1,321 million for
financial years ending 22 February, 1997, 28 February, 1998 and 27 February, 1999,
respectively. Corresponding values reported on Worldscope are £944, £824 and £955
million.7 In contrast, Worldscope operating profit (WC04001) is identical to the UK
GAAP numbers reported by Tesco: £774, £817 and £934 million in 1997, 1998 and 1999,
5 Thomson Financial does not publish details of its Worldscope global template for proprietary reasons and
so few details of adjustment procedures are available.
6 No statistically significant difference exists between operating cash flow values reported by Extel and the
Company Accounts Archive.
7 Following BM, Worldscope operating cash flow is computed as the sum of WC04201 and WC04831 for
Worldscope accessed through the Datastream platform. In Tesco’s case, the sum of WC04201 and WC04831
is equal to Worldscope item WC04860 (Net Cash Flow - Operating Activities).
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respectively.8 Accordingly, BM’s cash flow-based accrual measure contains a mixture
of Worldscope adjustments (to cash flow), non-discretionary accruals, and earnings
management. Whether procedures such as the Jones and modified-Jones models are
capable of fully disentangling these effects is doubtful.9
(ii) Market Rewards to Earnings Management
Underpinning BM’s empirical analysis are the joint hypotheses that managers
manipulate earnings using accruals and that share prices respond positively to such
manipulation (see Section 6 in their paper). Focusing on the second of these
predictions, the precise mechanism through which earnings management succeeds in
(artificially) boosting share price is not elucidated in the paper. Presumably BM have in
mind recent evidence on the market rewards to meeting and beating analysts’ earnings
expectations (Barth, Elliot and Finn, 1999; Bartov, Hayn and Givoly, 2002; Kasznik and
McNichols, 2002; and Skinner and Sloan, 2002). A consistent result emerging from this
body of research is that share prices tend to rise when firms announce earnings that
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.
Linking the earnings management behaviour predicted by BM prior to share swap
acquisitions with the literature documenting market rewards to meeting and beating
earnings expectations suggests the following three supplementary predictions. First,
to the extent that market rewards to income increasing accruals are hard to justify
in the presence of negative earnings surprises, share swap bidders are expected to
report non-negative earnings surprises prior to the agreement date (i.e., year 0 and
possibly year −1). Second, conditional on observing a positive earnings surprise,
the agreement date for bidders intent on securing the market rewards to earnings
management should follow quickly after the earnings announcement date (in case
prices subsequently fall as less favourable earnings information arrives). Third, the
pricing gains to income increasing earnings management are expected to concentrate
at the point when earnings information is released to the market. Accordingly, a large
fraction of the positive abnormal returns reported in Table 16 for the two-year window
preceding the agreement date should cluster around earnings announcement dates.
Evidence consistent with these three predictions would lend further weight to BM’s
conclusion that bidders in share for share acquisitions manage their pre-acquisition
earnings upwards in an attempt to influence the exchange ratio.
(iii) Alternatives to Managing Accruals
Consistent with a large body of work in the earnings management literature, BM focus
on operating accruals as the manipulation instrument of choice. Good reasons exist
to explain why BM and prior research focus on operating accruals. Nevertheless, it is
important to recognise that managers intent on manipulating investors’ perceptions
of firm performance and value are able to select from an array of different methods.
8 Tesco’s comparative income statement figures for 1998 were restated in its 1999 accounts to comply with
Financial Reporting Standard No.12: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets. Figures reported
by Worldscope for 1998 are the original numbers published in the 28 February, 1998, accounts rather than
the subsequently restated comparatives from the 27 February, 1999, accounts.
9 If Worldscope applies the same adjustment procedure to all firms then a portion (but not all) of the
Worldscope-specific effect may be captured by the constant in the first stage regression estimation.
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Managing reported earnings is one option. However, even for this option the choices
available to management are extensive. In addition to manipulating operating accruals,
managers are able to exploit their discretion over non-operating items (Comprix
and Muller, 2006) and classificatory decisions (McVay, 2006). Prior research also
demonstrates that earnings are managed through real operating decisions including
transaction timing (Hirst and Hopkins, 1998), discretionary investment expenditures
(Bange and DeBondt, 1998; and Bushee, 1998) and share repurchases (Bens, Nagar,
Skinner and Wong, 2003; and Hribar, Jenkins and Johnson, 2006). Of course, managers
seeking to influence investors’ perceptions need not resort to manipulating GAAP
earnings. Alternative strategies include walking down analysts’ earnings expectations to
increase the probability of reporting a positive earnings surprise (Bartov et al., 2002; and
Kasznik and McNichols, 2002) and disclosing alternative non-GAAP earnings constructs
(Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Larson, 2003; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004; and
Choi, Lin, Walker and Young, 2007).
Extant earnings management research has done a poor job of attempting to
understand how and why managers choose between these alternative manipulation
methods. My guess is that the pecking order of methods depends on managerial,
firm and environmental factors. Research aimed at identifying these conditioning
variables and understanding how managers choose between alternative manipulation
methods represents an important next step for the earnings management literature
for several reasons. First, assuming that all firms in a particular sample employ broadly
the same (single) approach to manipulation is likely to yield extremely low power
tests. Second, attempts to better understand managers’ manipulation choices arguably
represents a more interesting and relevant research question (particularly to standard
setters and regulators) than the traditional and more prosaic question of whether
managers actually engage in manipulation (the well established answer to which is: yes
they do!).
Recent research has started to shed light on managers manipulation strategies.
For example, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) use a survey approach to elicit
managers’ preferred methods for manipulating earnings. Their findings are interesting
because contrary to received wisdom in the earnings management literature, managers
indicate a preference for real earnings management over pure accounting manipula-
tions. In related work, Zang (2006) explores the interaction between managers’ use of
real and accrual manipulations. Results indicate that managers use real manipulation
before accrual manipulation, and that the two methods serve as substitutes.
(iv) Measuring Earnings Management in Small Samples
Sample selection rules applied by BM yield in a relatively small final sample: just 55
observations. As empiricists, we often view such small samples with considerable scepti-
cism due to concerns about insufficient statistical power, while entirely overlooking the
potential benefits that a small sample can offer. The advantages of large sample work
are frequently emphasised in the context of earnings management research (see BM:
Section 6). However, these benefits are obtained at a significant price: most notably the
use of relatively blunt procedures such as discretionary accruals models for estimating
earnings management activity. Accordingly, what appears based on sample size to be
a high power test actually turns out to be nothing of the sort due to problems with
measuring earnings management.
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Small yet relative comprehensive samples such as the one used by BM provide
researchers with an opportunity to adopt a more detailed forensic approach to
the identification of earnings management, based on careful analysis of published
financial statements. This was the method used by Smith (1992) in his influential
study of UK accounting practices. Despite lacking the usual methodological and
statistical rigor associated with academic research on earnings management, Smith’s
work generated the interest and impact that most accounting researchers can only
dream about. A key reason why Smith’s research proved so influential was that his
approach convincingly demonstrated both the methods used by management to inflate
reported earnings and their overall impact on published numbers: readers could see
the earnings management and its effects for themselves. In short, Smith’s work focused
on real accounting practices. Exploiting the opportunity afforded by a small sample
to conduct a Smith-style analysis of actual earnings management practices represents
one potentially fruitful way of shedding new light on managers’ reporting behaviour, as
well as providing new insights into the primary accounting methods used to manipulate
reported results.
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